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Abstract
This article engages with the concept of liminality by focusing on two, theoretically and empirically dubious categories: the EU and Hamas. Theoretically, both are in-between the traditional categories we use to make sense of the world and as such they challenge state-based, Westphalian, Eurocentric categories that dominate International Relations (IR). By analysing Hamas and the EU as liminals this article demonstrates how far certain collective discourses and non-state identities can go in challenging pre-existing categories on which the social order of international relations relies. Hamas does not ‘fit’ into pre-existing social categories of the social order in world politics. The EU does not fit into the system of states in international relations, although it attempts, in part, to behave like one at a supranational level. Empirically, both the EU and Hamas are able to exercise power to differing degrees depending on context. Both engage in politics on a procedural, day-to-day level that has significant consequences for their knowledge of themselves and the Other. This article explores how the liminal identity of these two actors impacts on their relations with each other and importantly their relations of Self. In exploring the procedural relations of the EU and Hamas it argues for the necessity of recognising liminal categories in IR theory and practice while at the same time highlighting the limits of such in-between categories in a world order still structured around the state. 







The discipline of international relations (IR) is built on a number of ontological and epistemological ‘founding myths’ (Smith 2000, 2004) that shape how we as scholars and practitioners determine the political and social world. These myths stem from the role of sovereign state actors in shaping and determining the order of world politics. The two traditionally dominant schools of thought, realism and liberalism, have argued over the roles of structure and agency in determining state behaviour and ultimately IR, however, both are ontologically and epistemologically grounded in specific assumptions built around ideas of sovereign states as actors in world politics. The modern-day order of things as historically constructed and geographically specific goes unchallenged. In the context of a world made up of ahistorical sovereign state-units the EU and Hamas are  both actors that function outside of this order and the categories that IR as a discipline and we as scholars and practitioners have traditionally used to both make sense of and ultimately to construct the world around us. 

It is with this in mind that this article attempts to build on the work of those who have sought to challenge the dominant Westphalian narrative in IR (Cox 1981, 1987; Enloe 1990, 2004; Smith 2000, 2004; Walker 1993) and whose work encompasses much of what has come to be thought of as critical IR. As such the work of those questioning the dominance of Eurocentric categories of state and sovereignty in determining the current world order (Barkawi and Laffey 2002, 2006; Chandler 2000; Darby 2004; Doty 1996; Grovagui 2002; Krishna 2001; Slater 1998; Tickner 2003) will inform the argument alongside the work of those who have developed the idea and studied the role of liminars in IR which will be used to conceptualise the in-between nature of the EU and Hamas and what happens when they interact, while the concept of liminality itself as a conceptual category useful for understanding world politics will be tested.

The argument will proceed as follows: firstly, we will explore the traditional categories through which IR has attempted to make sense of a world made up of sovereign state actors in an anarchic system and upon which any definition of liminars as challenging this order rests. Secondly, we will demonstrate how the EU and Hamas can both be considered liminars within the existing literature relating to the traditional categories of IR and that which seeks to offer a different ontological approach and epistemological framework of analysis while being attentive to the differences between them and representative of  uneven power dynamics. Thirdly, we will unpack how EU-Hamas relations have developed since 2006 and the problems that have occurred due to their liminar positions according to the dominant order of world politics. And finally, we will examine in greater detail how this specific case study relates to IR as a whole, critical literature more generally and the debates around liminality more specifically, in addition to what such an analysis means for EU-Hamas relations in procedural terms.

The order of things
In recent years IR scholars have questioned the assumptions on which the discipline and subsequent practice of IR sits. The primacy of the sovereign state-unit as the privileged actor or the referent object around which world politics is assumed to operate has been challenged on a number of fronts, enabling a whole raft of critical approaches, such as, constructivism, (Kurki, 2006; Wæver, 1998) historical materialism (Cox 1987; Stokes 2005), feminism (Enloe 1990, 2004; Peterson 1992; Youngs 2004), poststructuralism (Ashley 1984; 1996; Edkins 1999) and postcolonialism (Barkawi and Laffey 2002, 2006; Fanon 1967, 2008; Darby 2004; Krishna 2001; Mignolo 2000; Said 1988; Shapiro 1997; Spivak 1988). The critical nature of some of these theoretical approaches and the extent to which they move beyond existing paradigms of understanding, for example constructivism, is continually being debated. However, what this somewhat broad raft of approaches have in common is that they all in some way seek to either complicate the role of the sovereign state-unit in world politics, such that its role as an ahistorical, primary actor is not taken as given, as in the case of constructivism, or that the sovereign state-unit is replaced as the ontological starting point, as in the case of feminism with its gender paradigm, or historical materialism with its focus on the role of capital as being the primary source of power. Postcolonial approaches for their part contest the primacy of the sovereign state-unit and its ahistorical nature, illuminate the Eurocentric nature of such ways of thinking, demonstrate how the modern-state system is historically contingent on relations of domination culminating in practices of colonialism and argue that the identities of both coloniser and colonised are co-constitutive.

What these critical approaches to IR do, in different ways, is question what world politics is, where world politics is located and who acts in world politics. Many of the categories used to make-sense of the world, which in-turn are reproduced through ritualistic processes and everyday processual dynamics, have been shown to be historically and geographically specific to the western European experience but also concomitantly co-constitutive. Thus, both the self and other, thought of as separate identities are in fact co-constructed through shared relations and experiences regardless of the disparity in power between the actors. This co-constitutive identity can therefore be understood as liminar as it is neither self nor other as clearly defined but created in and reflective of the relations and the spaces in-between.

The concept of liminality, first developed in anthropological theories of ritual in the works of Arnold van Gennep (1960) and Victor Turner (1995), refers to a subjective state, conscious or unconscious, of being on the ‘threshold’ of or between two different existential planes, that is of being in a ‘liminal state’. In her attempt at inspiring empirical, culture-oriented work on the interface of identity formation and security, Anne Norton’s point of departure focuses on the ambiguity of identification (1988: 4-7). Iver B Neumann, who adopts Norton’s work in his own, argues that ‘Norton’s liminars are exemplified and embodied in groups of strangers’ (1996: 139-174) and ‘to Norton, liminars are groups living on the borderlines of society’ (1992: 221-226). Thus, for Norton, liminars are groups which the social order cannot fully absorb and it is precisely Norton’s preoccupation with ambiguity which calls for an empirical treatment of the role of liminars. For Karsten Friis, ‘The liminars threaten the ontological order of the entrepreneur by challenging his representation of Self and Other and his mediation of chaos, which ultimately undermines the legitimacy of his policy’ (2000). Meanwhile, for Jef Huysmans the liminar has to be ‘regulated’/‘controlled’ ‘as an ontological danger, and for the mediation of ‘daily security’ (1998: 242). Turner concludes that liminars are perceived as threatening because they undermine the very categorical distinctions that social structures rely on  (1995).  More recent studies of liminars in IR invite scholars and practitioners in the field to shift their gaze from the Self and its Other, to that which is to be found in between. In the Middle East context, Halliday convincingly argued: ‘… as agents of political change in the region, Middle Eastern states are far from being alone … [F]orces other than the state, the non-state and the ‘transnational’, in the sense of that which links societies without going through states, are recurrently important’ (2005: 229). In addition to these non-state forces that, as Halliday argued, are recurrently important in shaping our world in making our argument we focus on sovereignty as a set of practices concerned with power in all its articulations. By doing this we are able to recognise the agency of the EU and Hamas as actors and appreciate that both are undergoing contests over their identity and emerging as subjects in both senses of the word (Foucault 2008) in a system where singular sovereignty is understood as hegemonic and is seen to determine behaviours. Yet there are always some cross-overs which, by their simple existence, represent a political challenge to the order of things. All of which for this article raises two important and fundamental questions: one empirical: how do liminars relate and interact within a system in which they are neither wholly self nor wholly other? And the other theoretical: how do we understand these actors in a system in which their liminal identity remains a challenge? We thus now move on to unpack the identification of the EU and of Hamas as liminars.

The EU and Hamas as liminars
The cases of the EU and Hamas as liminar and the relations between such liminars are chosen for the following reasons: The EU has been seen in the literature (Rumelili 2012; Stoicescu 2012) as both liminar and non-liminar, or a community that itself creates other liminars as argued by Bahar Rumelili in her earlier study of liminality and the perpetuation of conflict in Turkish-Greek relations (2003). The EU is an evolving project, its identity undetermined and under continual renegotiation by its member states and citizens as the recent rejection of the Constitution and the struggles over the Lisbon Treaty attest. However, for our argument the EU can be considered a liminar or in-between as Halliday would have it, in the following ways: the EU is partly made up of sovereign states, that is they make up its members and give the EU some of its power, however, it is also a set of institutions composed of professionals and experts that themselves have their own interests and their own power networks that operate independently from the sovereign member states. Therefore, it is partly other to the Westphalian system of sovereign states. The EU is also a liminar regarding the international system. As a regional body that represents states’ interests, engages and interacts with and within the international system it can be seen as ‘self’, that is there is no constituent part of the EU – sovereign states and institutions – that could be seen as ‘other’ or outside traditional understandings of the international system. However, the EU can also be seen as ‘other’ to the international system for the same hybrid – sovereign states and institutions – reason. That the EU is capable of both acting in the interests of its members and pursuing interests of its own makes it a non-state actor meaning that the EU is also ‘other’, that is outside of the traditional international system made up of actors understood as sovereign state units. In turn, the EU is neither an international nor regional institution that acts either solely in the interests of its members, with no internally generated interests of its own, nor vice versa. The very identity of the EU is thus, partly self and partly other. The EU in this regard is unlike any other international, transnational or regional organisation. The EU has acquired a set of supranational powers while member states have maintained their sovereignty, working to complicate the idea of sovereignty as being located in and promoted by state-units (see Bickerton 2012; Hobson and Sharman 2005). The specificity of the EU in the international sphere and its position as a constantly evolving project results in an identity that is constantly being re-made in reference to its others.

Hamas’s liminality and challenge to the Westphalian system is perhaps more explicit and/or excepted within IR (see Mullin 2010) and can be understood in the following ways. As a Palestinian movement, Hamas is by default liminar. Palestine, while recognised as a state  in bilateral relations by over 130 governments (ICC 2012: 192) , is not a sovereign state unit in the functional sense of the term. Therefore, any representative of the Palestinian nation is liminar. Palestine’s very identity is in-between. The ‘space’ of Palestine exists – however contested and threatened – within the international imagination. Palestine exists as a functioning state bureaucracy, it has all the internationally recognised symbols of a sovereign state, its own passport, its own flag, its own anthem, its own sports’ teams that compete internationally, and now of course its own seat as a non-member observer state at the United Nations. This decision complicates matters further by reinforcing the PLO – not the Palestinian Authority, not Fatah and not Hamas – as the official representative of Palestine internationally. However, Palestine is not sovereign, it does not control its own borders or the monopoly of violence within its own space – a space that is itself non-contiguous and consistently under threat. The Israeli occupation of Palestinian Territory means that Palestine, while considered a nation after the struggle of the PLO over the last fifty years for international recognition, is not and cannot be considered in any sense sovereign. Thus, the Palestinian condition itself is liminar.

Looking at Hamas more specifically as a representative of the Palestinian people and their nation, the elections of 2006, the subsequent Israeli and international boycott and internal struggle with its rival Fatah and Hamas’ take-over of Gaza in 2007 finds Hamas in-between, it is neither government nor opposition, but both, as Fatah and Hamas represent the Palestinian people in different geographical locations, Fatah in the West Bank and Hamas in Gaza. This complex and continually evolving relationship is highlighted well by the 2009 petition to the International Criminal Court (ICC) after Israeli Operation Cast Lead (OCL) in Gaza. Here the Palestinian Authority, run by Fatah, petitioned the ICC to become a party to the Rome Statute in order to request an international war crimes tribunal to investigate Israeli actions during OCL. While the November 2012 decision by the UN General Assembly to grant Palestine non-member observer state status now means that Palestine is able to request the institution of a war crime tribunal, the petition to the ICC was made in 2009 by the Palestinian Authority – partly it was recognised by the ICC to support their UN status change bid  (ICC 2012: 191) – even though the Palestinian Authority has no de-facto control over Gaza where the war crimes were alleged to have taken place during OCL. Furthermore the ICC effectively deferred making any decision while awaiting the outcome of the status change that in turn recognised the PLO as the international representative of Palestine, not the Palestinian Authority. 

Organisationally, Hamas is a political party, a social movement and an armed resistance organisation. Officially founded in 1987 during the First Intifada it has an older history linked to attempts – initially ignored by Israel – by Islamic Palestinian groups to undermine the secular PLO during the 1980s (Sayigh 2004: 629).  It has effectively operated since the mid-1990s as a social movement providing services for Palestinians disenfranchised by Palestinian Authority mismanagement while working to cement its political and military agenda within Palestinian socio-political society and history of armed struggle. These three facets of Hamas cannot be easily separated from each other and work to reaffirm Hamas’ place in opposition not only to Israel but also to Fatah and the Oslo Peace Process. In addition when looking at the processual dynamics of Hamas and the type of government it wishes to pursue (which will be discussed in greater detail later) it is both partly self and partly other: Self here referring to international norms derived from Eurocentric experiences of government and politics and ‘other’ referring to what Edward Said referred to as the ‘Oriental other’ against which the European self is constructed (1988). In attempting to practice an Islamic form of what it terms ‘welfare democracy’ Hamas can be seen as taking from both ‘traditions’ as they are self-defined by European and Islamic history. Hamas does not wish to practice an entirely ‘Islamic’ form of governance, as defined by the politics of the region and by European misunderstandings of Islamic politics, nor does it wish to practice a wholly Western model of secular democracy. With the de facto territorial fragmentation of the Occupied Territory and Palestinian society that ensued soon after the Palestinian legislative elections of January 2006, Hamas found itself not only struggling for a just order through its resistance strategy, but also in competition with its main rival Fatah, over the legitimate representation of the Palestinian people at the national, regional and international levels. Thus, Hamas has been left with a key struggle for retaining the popular legitimacy it had built up to the 2006 elections.

Thus, in this article we choose to focus on the agency of both the EU and Hamas (Hamas being a case of an in-between: it is not a state actor but neither is it a non-state actor. Similarly, the EU is not a state actor either): both units of analysis operate as regional and international actors in their respective domains. This perspective privileges processual dynamics over static conceptual frameworks and examines the challenges that arise in the encounters between liminars: the EU as a power centre on the one hand, and its increasingly vocal peripheries (Hamas in Palestine). Capitalising on field research carried out by one Michelle Pace, this article thus analyses several elements that exist in the relations between the liminar EU and another liminar: the Hamas movement in Palestine. It is important to note here that the uneven power dynamics between the two liminars is in itself an important factor in determining the relations between them, with the EU categorising Hamas as other to European notions of self and Hamas seeking legitimacy through positive relations with the EU who it sees as a regional and world power. Analyzing official discourses in Brussels and Gaza, we demonstrate how, by situating Hamas in different and also liminal/precarious positions with respect to Western notions of political parties, the EU’s policies attempt to fit Hamas within existing categories of the social order in international relations. An analysis of the EU and Hamas as liminal actors thus contributes to our understanding of EU-Hamas relations by showing that such attempts at clear-cut categorisation simply do not work.

In addition to challenging the categorisation of traditional IR the case of EU-Hamas relations also challenges the idea of liminality or the possibility of a fixed liminar identity and ultimately reaffirms the very same traditional categories of IR. Theoretically, both actors appear to be liminars within the context of a set of Westphalian categories constructed out of a particular European experience. They are only liminal or in-between because of what we believe them to be between, that is sovereign-state units and their opposite. Empirically both the EU and Hamas as in-between actors through their procedural practices themselves reaffirm such Westphalian categories as both assume the powers of sovereign states or seek sovereign statehood. Thus, the concept of liminality  –  while a useful one in conceptualising and understanding the procedural dynamics in relations between the EU and Hamas as actors who are themselves neither state or non-state and are determined by those self-same categories liminality as a concept is attempting to undermine – is ultimately limited by state-centric modes of thinking and practices dominant in international relations.

Liminal encounters: the case of Hamas
When Yasser Arafat passed away on 11 November, 2004, Hamas’ ranks inside and outside of the Occupied Palestinian Territory deliberated on their movement’s strategy in a post-Arafat era. One crucial decision was whether to participate in the forthcoming PLC elections that Abbas – who had won the Presidential election of 9 January, 2005 – had promised. Hamas’s positive results in the municipal elections of 2005 encouraged members to participate in the forthcoming 2006 PLC elections. This turnaround in Hamas’s decision faced some internal religious disapproval. Some voices within the movement considered these elections to be forbidden (haram) as they involved a compromise over the ‘Islamic land of Palestine and Islamic sovereignty over it’ (Hroub 2006: 30). However, after extensive deliberations and thorough consultations, Hamas’s highest authority, the Istishari Council, took the final decision that Hamas should fully participate in these elections. This process highlights Hamas’s skilful navigation of the popular will and popular demands on Palestinian identity: who the Palestinians stand for – a democratic nation with a large Muslim population. Whereas the movement took an important lead in the Al-Aqsa Intifada (switching back to its violent, militant ideology), the post-Oslo period was also marked by truces, periods of calm which culminated in the decision to run for the election. Several factors, contributed to this decision. Following the events of 9/11 and the US-led ‘war on terror’, Hamas had to tone down on its militant approach. With Fatah showing signs of fragmentation and disarray and the public’s ensuing disillusionment with the PA (with its prevalence of corruption and its failure to bring any positive results for the Palestinians through the ‘peace process’), Hamas saw a window of opportunity to put itself forward as a credible alternative for the Palestinian people. At the same time an internal strife on who should lead the movement emerged following the Israeli assassination of several Hamas founders including Salim, Mansur, Abu Hannud, Shihadah, Al-Maqadmah, Abu Shanab, Sheikh Yassin and Al-Rantisi between 2001 and 2004. Hamas looked to Lebanon’s Hezbollah for a working model of a successful Islamic political party as well as a militant Islamist group that balances its political, charitable and military activities (Chehab 2007; Levitt 2006; Mishal 2003; Tamimi 2007; Milton-Edwards and Farrell 2010; McGeough 2009). Despite all these efforts, the EU’s social situating of Hamas as a liminal actor ensured that the movement cannot experience the possibility of achieving a secure place within the established social order.

When Hamas (the Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya, the Islamic Resistance Movement),​[1]​ won the 2006 Palestinian Parliamentary elections, the EU responded by boycotting the democratically elected Hamas-led government – even though it had sent its own mission to observe these elections which were declared fair, free and transparent (EU 2006). The EU has worked hard to represent a set of core values including democracy, liberty, justice and human rights and its reading of Hamas as a ‘terrorist’ organisation meant that its election result disturbed the very foundations upon which the EU’s identity is built. The EU (and its member states) has achieved stable institutions guaranteeing all these values of democracy, human rights, rule of law, justice etc and has been keen to promote a modern, liberal version of democracy beyond its borders, in its own interests and image, for security and stability in its neighbourhood and for the construction of a self at home. This democracy promotion policy covers the Palestinian Territory. Thus, Hamas’ election result undermined the legitimacy of the EU’s democracy promotion policy.

Moreover, when the EU refused to recognise the new government it froze direct aid to the Palestinian Authority (PA) until Hamas agreed to three conditions imposed by the Middle East Quartet (which includes the EU, the US, the UN and Russia). The EU thus attempted to make the uncertainty (created by Hamas’ coming to power democratically) certain by labelling Hamas as liminal and Other. The EU’s Othering of Hamas has been legitimized through the discursive construction of the movement’s lack of conformity to the rules of international society. In attempting to make Hamas in the image of what the EU and the ‘international community’ stand for as a Self, the Quartet demanded that first Hamas renounce violence, second recognise Israel and third accept all previous agreements between the PLO and Israel, without any consultation with elected Hamas officials (from the political wing at least) a priori.

It is the ‘resistance against occupation’ stance adopted by Hamas that has caused most concern in the EU, US, Israel and internationally. The armed resistance advocated and practiced by Hamas runs contra to the strongly held perception that the Westphalian structure of sovereign states is the only framework for the ‘legitimate’ use of violence (El-Affendi 2007: 4; Finlay forthcoming) and that such violence is now regulated by international law (Lustick 1997). Such a perception, while failing to take account of the argument made by those like Charles Tilly (1993), that violence formed an integral part of the creation of the modern European state system, follows and reproduces a logic that states may practice violence in certain legally sanctioned contexts but when movements use it, such violence threatens traditional understandings. This is where Hamas challenges and threatens Western certainties and legal categories. Or, in Turner’s terms, Hamas is neither here nor there.

For the EU, Hamas is an ambiguous entity, an Other, which cannot be easily classified or categorized into an existing, pre-given structural position. The EU as we have discussed is a constantly evolving project both international and supranational organisation. Yet, Hamas as a political actor accepts the EU as a benign and relevant actor within the international system of states and has been striving for its recognition, in part because the EU is not the USA. This recognition almost came to fruition when Hamas accepted to enter into a power sharing agreement with its main rival Fatah on 8 February, 2007, thereby indirectly accepting the three conditions: renounce violence, recognise Israel and accept all previous agreements between the PLO and Israel. Hamas said it went into the agreement in anticipation of a reward, in return, by the international community - its recognition and international credibility. ‘Hamas wants international acceptance and legitimacy and recognition, wants to be part of the international community and wants to stay in power’, said Ahmed Youssef. ‘ But we misread the EU …’ (Michelle Pace’s personal interview with Dr Ahmed Youssef, Political Adviser to Ismail Haniyeh, Office of the Prime Minister, Gaza, 11 September, 2007).

In reality the establishment of the National Unity government in March 2007, did not see a policy change on the part of the EU, despite Hamas moving closer to the Quartet’s three conditions. Following the US and Israel, the EU continued to demand full compliance in exchange for the resumption of aid. For the EU, officials claim that they cannot engage with Hamas because of its ideological beliefs as a religiously-motivated group. The EU’s reluctance in acknowledging Hamas as a relevant political actor is due to a mistaken construction of Hamas as a monolith: giving Hamas international recognition does not straightforwardly enhance Hamas’ legitimacy. Because of Europe’s controversial legacy in the Middle East region, international recognition is a mixed chalice for Hamas’ constituency, particularly when regarded as caving in to ‘Western’ pressure (Gunning 2010). The EU reacted somewhat more positively to a spring 2011 reconciliation agreement between Hamas and Fatah aimed at the formation of a government of national competences and ‘technocrats’ to prepare for the next Palestinian elections. However, this more positive reaction is conditional on the fact that the EU will deal with ‘technocrats’ and thereby independent representatives of the Palestinian people rather than with Hamas officials, thus negating Hamas’s identification (see Cooley and Pace 2012)​[2]​ and re-enforcing the power relations between Hamas and its interlocutors. For the EU, Hamas remains a liminal group of strangers and a group that the social order cannot absorb (see Norton 1988).

The EU’s refusal to recognise Hamas discursively produces the movement as being outside the international system (of states and non-state actors) since it includes Hamas on its list of proscribed ‘terrorist organisations’ and consequentially as undemocratic, which thus rules the movement out from being compatible with European values and what the ideal of Europe stands for (liberal democracy, etc). In this manner, Hamas’ liminal position is situated in a perpetual state of becoming (Rumelili 2012; Stoicescu 2012). Moreover, the EU discursively construes Hamas as incapable of change due to its resort to violence, ignoring more pragmatic statements from its political leaders, its ceasefires (2005, 2008, 2009, 2011 and 2012) / offers for a ‘hudna’​[3]​ – which simultaneously symbolise the possibility and impossibility of transition. For the EU, Hamas undermines the clear-cut social categories of modern, democratic, civilized, developed etc. and does not fit neatly into the social ordering of international relations. 

In this manner, Hamas is constructed as the Other, an absolutist group which is unlikely to compromise and accept the international community’s norms. In this way, the EU creates its relation with Hamas as a mutually exclusive one, as two irreconcilable subject positions. Hence, Hamas’ liminality is the product of discursive configurations and policy practices constituted by the EU (and other international actors including the US and Israel) which ignore realities on the ground: ‘Hamas seeks international recognition because that is a crucial way for it to stay in power. But the group in Gaza and Damascus (now in Doha)​[4]​ know there is a cost for that recognition – a political cost of flexibility and pragmatism. And they are ready to pay the price. We have already seen signs in practice: the ceasefires, etc’ (Michelle Pace’s personal interview with an NGO Director, Ramallah, 9 September, 2007). ‘We are already building our own institutions and we have taken the decision to enter into the democratic process: to run for elections in 2006 was our first major step in this transformation … We believe in welfare democracy: I mean good governing means for me justice for all people living on this land, regardless of gender, religion, their political opinion, etc. This democracy may not be the European, liberal model type but it is what works best for us in this context’ (Michelle Pace’s personal interview with Dr Basem N Naim, Minister of Youth, Sport and Health, PNA, Gaza, 11 September, 2007).

This highlights the multiple practices and images that can arise from liminal actors and Hamas’s attempts in particular at undertaking a journey from a position of vulnerability to a potential strengthened position (if the movement gains international recognition one day as the PLO did before it) and from invisibility to visibility (Stoicescu, 2012). As one Council official disclosed with Michelle Pace, the foreign minister of Hamas in Gaza sent an official letter to the EU back in October 2011 requesting an official dialogue with Lady Catherine Ashton and her EEAS (the EU’s External Action Service) team as well as Members of the European Parliament. This letter was sent to the Council for Foreign Relations at the European Parliament and Michelle Pace was led to understand that work has been underway at establishing a way in which the EU can enter into a dialogue with elected Hamas officials (Michelle Pace’s personal interview with an official from one of the EU member states’ Permanent Representative Offices, Brussels, 31 March, 2009). Hence, Hamas’ discourse on the EU constructs Hamas as partly like and partly different: it is a political party that aspires for international recognition and for this objective, it aims to converge its principles with European values keeping in mind that Hamas has a different cultural, historical and geographical background when contrasted to that of the EU. The key message that Hamas is working on is that through the EU’s historical use of political dialogue as a key instrument in its external relations, a bridge can be built between the EU and Hamas to forge a better understanding of each other, thus bringing Hamas into existence as an internationally recognised actor through a set of ritualistic processes.

However, although thus far the EU does not officially engage with Hamas, it regularly condemns Israel’s and during the Mubarak ear – Egypt’s – siege of Gaza, especially since Israel’s incursion into Gaza in December 2008 – January 2009 in Operation Cast Lead. The EU has also condemned Israel’s violence against the Gaza Flotilla that sought to break the blockade of Gaza in May 2010, stating that such measures are against international legal norms which it upholds. Moreover, the liminal identification of Hamas makes it challenging for the EU to settle on a policy of engagement with the movement that would enhance its ontological security. The EU thus pre-identifies Hamas as different from what the EU stands for – yet, it condemns what is being done to Hamas in Gaza as going against those norms that it equally stands for. For its part, although Hamas finds itself unable to receive international recognition by the EU (thus far), the movement has been engaged in various discussions with non-EU ‘European’ countries, most prominently Norway, Russia, Switzerland and Turkey. It has also experimented with regular meetings with various high-ranking officials from a number of EU countries and as is publicly known, Germany has been involved in mediating, through indirect negotiations between Hamas and Israel, over the release of Corporal Gilad Shalit who was taken hostage by the Qassam Brigades (Hamas’ paramilitary wing) in 2006. Hamas thus discursively and socially constructs the EU’s liminality as a fluid space and positions different EU actors within this space.  Therefore, the EU is a venue which generates processes of identification not just to aspiring members (like Turkey) but also to others who wish to be embraced as relevant parties for dialogue in particular contexts. Although Hamas does not desire to be recognised as ‘European’, the movement as political actor aspires for international recognition as a party worthy of a dialogue and as ‘democratic’. As a liminal actor, Hamas therefore attempts to achieve ontological security by positioning itself within the EU’s established social categories (that is, as democratic) but at the same time, it fails to do so successfully because it is socially and practically constructed by the EU as an entity that stands across these very categories.

Hamas, in turn, is capitalising on the EU’s social constitution of its identity as a liminar by representing itself as both self and other – thus constructing a new kind of subjectivity in international relations. Hence, improving their image is also the argument frequently mentioned by Hamas leaders in favour of engagement with European actors (Kausch 2009: 4). In fact, Hamas officials from the political wing of the movement in Gaza insist that what they expect from the EU is not some kind of special treatment for Hamas as an Islamist movement but of the EU including the elected political members to treat Hamas just like any other representative, societal group (Michelle Pace’s personal interviews with Hamas officials, Gaza and Nablus, 2007 and 2009).  By actually experiencing the liminal ordeal to the extent that it has, Hamas is a good example of a communitas which has bolstered its image through its liminal experience (Turner 1995).

Hamas in fact draws from two key sources of legitimacy: the international community and Palestinian Resistance (the ‘nation’). However, Hamas’s legitimacy in the eyes of its followers is under constant attack. So, looking at the two dimensions of sovereignty (internal dimension and external dimension), although Hamas may appear to hold internal legitimacy despite the tight sanctions imposed by Israel on Gaza, it is the PA which declared Hamas illegal in Nablus (Michelle Pace’s personal interview with Hamas officials, Nablus, 11 September, 2007; Amnesty International 2008). Its external legitimacy is also questionable, given that it is not acknowledged as a relevant political actor, let alone a state. These identity narratives in terms of what Palestinian nationalists regard as ethno- or cultural features of the Palestinian nation underscore what the nation stands for and in terms of what the nation should and could be in order to constitute a modern state which mobilizes domestic loyalties and which obtains Western, that is, external, recognition. Thus, for instance, through their English media source, the Palestinian Information Center (http://www.palestine-info.co.uk/en/ (​http:​/​​/​www.palestine-info.co.uk​/​en​/​​)) Hamas presents, to an English speaking audience, different images, metaphors and cultural cues which Hamas officials/political elites use in their representations of liminal processes in their dialogue with European interlocutors. Such texts are important to understand the interplay with Hamas’s subject positions and the interpellation that predicates their efforts to negotiate the movement’s identities in relation to the EU. It follows that, as a liminal actor Hamas can transform its participants’ identities. For members of Hamas, the movement represents a liminal phenomenon characterized by varying degrees of freedom, egalitarianism, communion and creativity: Hamas’s transformative power in the context of Israeli occupation thereby depends on its degree of liminality (Yang 2000: 379). Hamas’ recognition of its liminality simultaneously means that it acknowledges the power of its very own agency to restructure the existing realities and to create new ones. 

Hamas officials have already convinced Swiss, Norwegian, Russian and Turkish officials that the movement can be persuaded into heeding to international norms as long as Hamas’ concerns are taken care of (personal communication with Swiss, Norwegian, Russian and Turkish officials, March 2010). But, while single states like Norway, Switzerland, Turkey or Russia can play important bridging roles they cannot change the social construction of world politics. In addition the extent to which Hamas officials wish/are able to remain liminal within a wider Palestinian national movement defined by the right to self-determined statehood is questionable.

Liminal encounters: the case of the EU
Hamas’ liminality is in many ways easier to grasp and less contestable than the EU’s, in no small part because of the liminal nature of Palestine itself and the unequal power dynamics within which Hamas operates. The EU’s liminality in action is, like Hamas’, affected by its position in the international system, in this instance as a transnational and supranational project in progress and the forms of action available to it. Here the repertoires of action available to the EU in dealing with Hamas and other liminal or contentious actors are central in understanding the EU itself. Furthermore it is through these relations with liminals and non-state actors in addition to its relations with more traditional actors in the international system that the EU comes to know, understand and construct itself. 

Through the strategies discussed in relation to Hamas,  the EU on the one hand has been attempting to engulf Hamas within more inclusive conceptions of identification as highlighted by its promotion of the Quartet’s three conditions. On the other hand  the EU also attempts to ‘discipline’ the not so known (Hamas) by not allowing the movement’s strategies to challenge the ‘order’ or the ‘existing system’ and thus endeavours to make Hamas a visible, clear-cut Other. Here the concept of liminality highlights the double-politics of subversion and domestication at play in the encounters between the EU and resistance movements like Hamas. While the EU sought to impose after the Palestinian election results of 2006, the ‘parastate’ Hamas, (Erik Mohns 2009, personal communication) through a number of processes such as resistance, has opened up and situated the movement in a liminal space that subverts the EU’s categories as these are being created and negotiated. The EU has come a long way since the 2006 elections when it found itself experiencing an event that placed the whole organisation in unfamiliar surrounds: suddenly the election of Hamas was a reality that the EU had to confront and the EU’s bureaucratic machinery was pushed to rethink its arsenal of democracy discourse. The possibility of engaging with Hamas has been fraught with difficulties as explained above. But, given that non-engagement has not worked either, the indirect talks between various EU member states’ representatives and different political figures from the Hamas movement may be moving towards the possibility of a ‘third way’ whereby difference is acknowledged and the liminal actor is recognised and accepted as liminal, as both Other and Self (Norton 1988).

This possibility of a ‘third way’ is in line with Norton’s conclusion about the evolution of identity: ‘As the second movement of self was realized in the two terms self and other, the third moment of the self is realized in a third term, that which is both other and like. It is in this recognition of the union of self and other in that which is both other and like that the third self is conceived. It is in the recognition of the ambiguous – that which is neither self nor other – that the abstract understanding of identity is conceived’ (1988: 15).The EU’s sense of identity linked to the second phase described by Norton above has, to an extent, been dissolving and reforming into the third phase, bringing about a sense of disorientation across and within EU institutions. In order to address this uncertainty, EU officials have been frantically participating at workshops, conferences and discussions on Islamist movements, Hamas in particular. For instance, in mid-September 2009, officials from the Council of the European Union and the Commission joined a discussion on ‘Lessons from (not) dealing with Hamas and Hezbollah’, led by a former staff member of the International Crisis Group.  The core focus of the discussions was the actual substance and meaning of what it entails to engage Islamist parties. As one official puts it: ‘We cannot afford to take too hasty a decision on what we should think, on how we should deal with an entity which we actually do not know anything about (Hamas). We must be able to have a discussion also within the EU that will take into account the situation as it actually is on the ground and also as a result of our own reactions in 2006. It would be good if we could learn from our own mistakes’ (Michelle Pace’s personal interview with an official from one of the EU member states’ Permanent Representative Offices, Brussels, 31 March, 2009, emphasis authors’ own).

Hence, EU officials, on their part, have been making great efforts to try and understand Hamas and have thus been undergoing rituals of knowing themselves as EU actors and of getting knowledge about the Hamas movement through various means. Apart from the fact that such discussions on engagement have been contaminated by the EU’s listing of Hamas on its terrorist list,​[5]​ engaging with Hamas is thus mostly understood in Brussels in the sense of improving Europe’s image. The EU is fully aware that it has lost all the credit it had carefully built up in Palestine through its response to the results of the 2006 elections, and thus also its legitimacy as an external actor. In order to regain its legitimacy, the EU is trying to find a way of working with Hamas because it realises that Hamas is here to stay and must be included for any political settlement (vis-à-vis the EU’s goal of achieving a ‘two-state solution’ between the Israelis and the Palestinians) to work.

Conclusion
How does an analysis of the EU and Hamas as liminal actors contribute to our understanding of EU-Hamas relations? The existing literature in European Studies, Middle East Studies, Area Studies, the Social Movement and Democratisation literature, to mention a few, all attempt to make sense of this relation within existing categories in world politics. But, as this article has argued, this approach simply does not work.
By empirically analysing Hamas and the EU through an IR lens as liminal actors, this article has sought to demonstrate how far certain collective discourses and non-state identities can go in challenging pre-existing categories on which the social order of international relations relies. A focus on the ambiguous positions of these two liminal actors offers scholars of international relations key insights into the role of agents in changing the socially constructed structures in world politics and shows the world generally and identities more specifically to be continually in the making.












^1	  The Arabic word hamas (zeal) derives from the verb hamisa, which in a philosophic sense denotes the idea of throwing one’s self wholeheartedly behind a cause.
^2	  Thus the EU assumes the same position as the US and Israel in refusing point blank to enter into a dialogue with a national unity government which includes Hamas elected members. Nonetheless, the EU officially welcomed the reconciliation between the main Palestinian factions of April 2011. Nevertheless this does not change the EU’s position on Hamas - which remains on its terrorist list. The EU sees the agreement as one that will eventually result in a government of independent technocrats who will organise the next Palestinian elections. According to a high-ranking official at the Council of the EU, however, it does not view this agreement as a power sharing one or as establishing a unity government, as this would entail direct Hamas involvement, which would have legal implications for the EU. In order to keep the EU on their side, the Palestinians remain extremely semantically cautious when talking about this agreement. Thus, Palestinian power sharing is not only an internal Palestinian issue. The main challenge may be on the international scene, as Israel, the EU and not least the US have great problems recognising a political role for Hamas according to its share of support among the Palestinian public. A new Palestinian power sharing arrangement that includes Hamas may well face new rounds of international boycotts and sanctions, leaving it slim hope for survival. This apparent contradiction contributes to the current deadlocked situation: Palestinian political normalisation can only be achieved through reconciliation between Hamas and Fatah. At the same time normalisation is dependent on international support and recognition. At the time of writing, these two conditions canapparently not be met simultaneously.
^3	  Literally translated from Arabic this refers to a period of calm, quiet; a temporary truce/ceasefire. 
^4	  In May 2012 Hamas’s political bureau moved from Damascus to Doha following Hamas’ unease over the lethal force being used by the Syrian regime of Bashar Al-Assad against the Syrian Uprising. This was an interesting development and one that shows the continuous construction of Hamas’s identity through its relations with others in its region and the wider international community. The move to Doha can be interpreted in multiple ways: as Hamas showing signs of signing up to international norms; as Hamas acting pragmatically as Damascus no longer offered the save exilic sanctuary it once did; as Hamas shifting its allegiances in a Middle East where old centres of power in the Mashrek are realigning in the Gulf States. What must not be forgotten in Hamas’s decision making however is that its agency is limited by its status as a non-state actor and its prescribed status by some as a terrorist organisation.
^5	  It is important to note here that this listing legally allows EU officials to engage in a dialogue with Hamas officials – what it does not permit is the transfer of financial aid to Hamas. Michelle Pace’s interview with a Council of the EU official, June 2011.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